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The second factor was a growing opposition movement within Hungary. Strangely enough, the ambassador says, this opposition grew out of the peace movement, which in 1983 bravely declared that there was no difference between U.S. missiles and Soviet missiles. “Up until then, the officially accepted logic was that Western missiles were bad, and Russian missiles were good,” he says.

The third and perhaps most important factor is what Simonyi calls a “fermentation” within Hungary’s communist establishment. “I’m proud that I was part of that fermentation,” he says. “I had never in my life imagined I would be a member of the Communist Party. But life under a dictatorship is more complicated than most people think. Life takes precedence if you seriously want to preserve the integrity of your family. You cannot blame anyone for trying to get the best out of a lousy system. But at the same time, we had our beliefs. Underneath the surface, we lived our Western lives.”

As a very junior desk officer in Hungary’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Simonyi in 1983 started an exchange program between his country and the American Council of Young Political Leaders. “People don’t realize how important these exchanges are,” he says. “Once you open the world to communications, it really makes a difference.”

In 1986, he and his colleagues were responsible for pushing Hungary to adopt the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. His department, which he called “the most radical in the ministry,” also single-handedly established diplomatic ties with Israel and South Korea—a daring move considering Soviet antipathy toward both of those countries.

“By 1987, some independent organizations were established, and these organizations were the nucleus of later democratic parties. By that time, Hungary had opened to the world, and had also built very strong economic ties to the West,” Simonyi explains.

“You could have stopped Hungary from becoming a real democracy only if the Russians had rolled in, and in 1989, we were not sure if the Russians would come or not. They could have thrown [Mikhail] Gorbachev out at any time, and it would have been a great pretext to protect the interests of socialism. Our only guarantee was that we were moving fast. In critical times, you need to show courage and that you stand by certain principles, and I think that’s what happened in 1989.”

That’s the year when Hungary opened its border to thousands of fleeing East Germans—an event that marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War. But Simonyi says no one should be surprised that Hungary helped start the ball rolling.

“We’re not Slavic, we’re Western,” he says. “While I have a great deal of respect for Russian culture, the Soviet domination was so alien, so weird. Culturally, we had no relationship with Russia whatsoever. We were the most liberal of all Eastern bloc countries, without any doubt. This liberalism is what led to the pioneering work we did.”

In October 1989, Hungary’s Communist Party convened its final congress and re-established itself as the Hungarian Socialist Party. Over a four-day period, the parliament adopted legislation calling for multiparty elections and a direct presidential election.

That triggered a wave of discontent in East Germany, where tens of thousands of people escaped to the West via Hungary’s border with Austria. On Oct. 23, 1989—exactly 33 years after the 1956 revolution began—Hungary was declared a democratic republic.

In the spring of 1990, free elections were held for the first time in 45 years. Simonyi, meanwhile, immediately began promoting Hungarian membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
“At that time, the idea was still rejected by the West,” he says. “Their view was that these countries should remain outside NATO. I was the first Hungarian diplomat to work full time on the issue of NATO membership. In 1992, we moved to Brussels and stayed there for nine years.”

In Brussels, Simonyi served first as Hungary’s deputy chief of mission for the European Community and NATO, and then as head of Hungary’s NATO Liaison Office.

Hungary was finally admitted to NATO in 1999, and Simonyi was appointed Hungary’s first permanent representative on the NATO Council—a job he held until September 2002, when he was officially named Hungary’s ambassador to the United States.

Perhaps the most important milestone, however, took place on May 1, 2004, when Hungary and nine other countries officially joined the European Union.

“The prospect of NATO and EU membership has forced upon us a certain economic, institutional and political discipline, and I think the Hungarian transition was successful,” the ambassador says. “We created democratic institutions fairly quickly. We also created a pretty solid economy.”

Hungary’s 10 million people today enjoy a per-capita income of about $14,000—more than 60 percent of the EU average. That puts it in the same league as the Czech Republic, still behind Portugal and Greece, but far ahead of Poland.

“In just 10 years, we have moved from a manufacturing economy to a service economy,” Simonyi says. “This is really thanks to a total change in ownership laws, privatization and foreign investment.”

At the same time, Simonyi says, “We have a great responsibility to make sure the terrorist threat is fought not only by the United States but by all Europe, including Hungary.

“We’re allies, and our security is still pretty much dependent upon our cooperation with the United States. We want to be a good ally, and I think NATO is a core institution of the transatlantic relationship. Whether you’re a Democrat or a Republican, even people who oppose the war in Iraq still stay it was good that Hungary stuck with the United States in time of trouble.”

Although Hungary no longer has troops in Iraq, it does have a few hundred soldiers in Afghanistan, and is “very much engaged” in the Balkans—specifically Kosovo, an autonomous district populated by Muslim Albanians but controlled by Serbia.

One country democratic Hungary might help at some point is Cuba, which is one of only a handful of communist-ruled nations left in the world. In fact, in mid-October Hungarian Foreign Minister Kinga Göncz spoke with a group of Cuban-Americans in Miami, saying that Hungary’s successful transition to a free-market democracy could provide an example to Cuba, although she cautioned, “Changes have to come from Cuba itself. It cannot come from the outside.”

Simonyi reaffirms that belief: “I do not believe you can impose change entirely from the outside. That is against the logic of a society. But others can help, and I think it’s our responsibility to do so.”

Simonyi himself traveled to Cuba 28 years ago as a delegate to a youth festival. Given his political views, he clearly would not be welcome there today. “The Hungarians chartered a Pan Am aircraft. I really thought that was a sign of the times,” he recalls. “Don’t forget that in 1978, for such a thing to happen, you needed authorizations on the very highest levels. We could have chartered a Czech plane or a Soviet plane, but we flew into Havana on an American plane. That was a strong statement.”

So, does this 54-year-old rocker-turned-diplomat have any advice for fledgling young democracies?

Yes, he says, “but we have to be honest about the problems and difficulties of transition.”

“Don’t have illusions,” he cautions. “It’s not easy, but it’s rewarding. In Hungary, there have been more winners than losers, by far. Hungary’s most important resource is its talent and creativity, and these do not go well with dictatorships. Talent and creativity can only flourish in an atmosphere of freedom and independence.”

Larry Luxner is a contributing writer for The Washington Diplomat.