Diplomats, Officials Calling Actions of Putin Threat to Russian Democracy by David Tobenkin Although Vladimir Putinís official title in Russia remains ìpresidentî and not ìczar,î a chorus of foreigners and Russians alike say that a series of steps he has taken to centralize power under himself are a threat to Russiaís democracy and free market. Others, however, say that the moves may be relatively less objectionable given the daunting challenges facing the Russian state. Over the past year, a series of Putin-engineered steps have reduced the scope of political discourse and independent economic actors in Russia. Putin condoned the Oct. 25, 2003, arrest and subsequent trial of oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, former chief executive of the countryís largest oil company, Yukos Oil Co., in a move widely seen as politically driven. Khodorkovsky supported opposition candidates in the Russian parliamentary elections last December and was widely viewed as a potential rival to Putin for the presidency. In addition, Putin asserted government control over aspects of the countryís energy infrastructure that had been privatized, most notably Yukos. The government also suspended plans to privatize electricity monopoly Unified Energy System and reneged o n promises to lift foreign ownership restrictions on Gazprom, the state-controlled gas monopoly. Putin has constrained critics in the press by taking over or closing all independent national television channels. He has criticized foreign organizations that are developing Russian civil society institutions, warning foreign human rights organizations not to interfere in Russiaís domestic affairs in his May 2004 state of the nation speech. Putin has also limited the power of regional governors, who often defied Putinís predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. In 2000, Putin removed the governors from the Federation Council, the upper chamber of Parliament. He then undercut their power by creating seven presidential envoys to supervise them. Such actions, which prompted criticism from outside observers and Russian intellectuals, have culminated in a recent set of governmental reform proposals by Putin that critics contend are of even greater concern. The September standoff between Russian troops and Chechen militants who had taken hundreds hostage in a schoolhouse in Beslan ended in a massacre that left hundreds of children and teachers dead. Following the event, a flood of sympathy flowed to the Russian people and for Putinís call for a strong state response to terrorism. President George W. Bush praised Putin as ìa man I admire.î The day after Bushís remark, Putin, calling for the need for greater cohesion in the face of terrorism, announced a new plan that would appoint regional governors with the approval of regional legislatures, thereby ending the popular election of regional governors and independent legislators. In addition, Putinís plan would abolish elections of legislators in individual constituencies to the lower Russian legislative house, the Duma, and instead elect all members of the Duma on party lists, by proportional representation. As of now, half of the deputies are elected in constituencies and half by party lists. The reaction was swift from the United States and the diplomatic community. Two days after Putinís announcement, Bush said he was ìconcerned about the decisions that are being made in Russia that could undermine democracy.î Soon after, an open letter dated Sept. 28 and signed by 115 American and European diplomats and scholars accused Putin of endangering democracy in Russia. The letter, sent to NATO and European governmental leaders, noted: ìWe are deeply concerned that these tragic events are being used to further undermine democracy in Russia. Russiaís democratic institutions have always been weak and fragile. Since becoming President in January 2000, Vladimir Putin has made them even weaker. He has systematically undercut the freedom and independence of the press, destroyed the checks and balances in the Russian federal system, arbitrarily imprisoned both real and imagined political rivals, removed legitimate candidates from electoral ballots, harassed and arrested NGO leaders, and weakened Russiaís political parties. In the wake of the horrific crime in Beslan, President Putin has announced plans to further centralize power and to push through measures that will take Russia a step closer to authoritarian regime.î Among the more prominent signatories of the letter were former Czech Republic President Vaclav Havel, U.S. Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Joseph Biden (D-Del.), many professors and neoconservative analysts, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Richard C. Holbrooke, and former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt. Russian intellectuals and political rivals also voiced their concerns. Sergei Mitrokhin, a leader of the liberal Yabloko party, told the New York Times that the proposals represented ìthe elimination of the last links in a system of checks and balancesî and said that they ìcontradict the letter and the spirit of the constitution.î He added, however, that challenges to them would prove fruitless because ìin Russia, there is no independent parliament and no independent judiciary.î Putinís plan must still go through Parliament, but Putin and his party control more than two-thirds of the legislature directly. Two other political parties have already endorsed the planís ideas. Ironically, many regional governors whose positions would be affected by the change spoke out in favor of the plan. The reform plan, and Putinís other economic and political centralization actions to date, have not caused a revolt by Russian citizens. Voters reelected Putin by a landslide in March 2004 after having given similarly strong support to his United Russia party in the December 2003 State Duma elections. Putinís 70 percent-plus approval ratings more recently appear to have dipped into the 50 percent range, seemingly in response to Putinís backing of legislation to replace Soviet Union-era social welfare safety net provisions with cash payments. Putinís latest proposed governmental reforms, however, have elicited a mixed response domestically, and have failed to ignite widespread popular opposition. Experts say that reflects a number of factors. Buoyed by strong, oil-driven growth, Russia is a far stronger country than it was a decade ago, a condition that has become associated in votersí minds with Putin and the stability they believe he has fostered. There has also been popular disenchantment with pluralistic democracy and the countryís initial disastrous, Western-inspired economic reform measures. Russian voters have noted that the Soviet-era problems of cronyism and corruption have readily embedded themselves into the democratic process. Finally, many see the need for a strong state role to prevent terrorism and possible disintegration, an area of heightened concern given the traumatic loss of Soviet Union republics to independence. Some Russian experts say that although Putinís governmental reform proposals concern them, the situation is a complex one and the proposals must be analyzed in context. ìI am concerned by the state of democracy everywhere, including our own state by the way, but there are stages in a countryís development where stable institutions are more important,î said Jack F. Matlock, Jr., former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1987 to 1991. ìSome observers think any deviation from practices we have places Russia on the road to ruin. It may turn out to be so, but I would not yet draw that conclusionÖ. There are a lot of other factors one must take into account, in particular the difficulties of governing a country as varied and large as Russia and one where old system has been shattered and the current [one] is corrupt. My biggest criticism of Putin, in fact, is that his steps havenít sufficiently addressed such concerns.î Others say it is important to examine each proposal both on its own terms and in the context of Russian government overall. ìThe first proposal concerning the appointment of regional governors is an unambiguous setback for democracy in Russia,î said Joshua Tucker, an assistant professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University. ìAlthough certainly weakened over the past few years, the regional executives represent one of the few remaining institutions in Russia that could be capable in the future of checking the power of the presidentÖ. Moreover, the proposed policy change speaks wonders about the importance of popular elections in the mind of the current rulers of Russia. If one terrorist act leads to the removal of the franchise for regional elections, what will be the response to the next horror? ìThe second proposal [concerning the elimination of individual constituencies in State Duma elections] is not unambiguously bad for the long term future of democra cy in Russia,î Tucker continued. ìWhile eliminating the local representation associated with single member districts might strike many Americans as inherently undemocratic, the reality is that full proportional representation is widely used around the globe as a method of electing the legislative branch of government, including in many advanced industrialized democracies.Ö For Russia to have even the chance of a democratic future, it will need political parties to play a role in that future. Switching to full proportional representation will at least allow for that possibility by keeping political parties firmly entrenched in the national political scene.î In the larger sense, however, Tucker said it is clear that democracy in Russia to date has fallen short of the hopes of many observers. ìThe entire debate clearly highlights the point that the Russian democratic experiment has not evolved in the manner that many in West had hoped it would in the early 1990s,î Tucker said. ìElections may be free, but they are far from fair, especially given government control over television media. On paper, checks and balances remain a part of the Russian political system, but the extent to which the presidential administration can be checked in any meaningful sense is significantly less than is the norm in well-established democracies. Potential sources of opposition, including the legislative branch of government, the judiciary, political parties and regional elites, all remain very weak compared to the executive branch.î And the trend toward centralization under Putin continues. In late September, the Federation Council approved a measure allowing Putin effective control over the body that approves candidates for the countryís higher courts. The measure would also need to be approved by the lower house of Parliament, the Duma. Putinís growing power has caused scholars to examine his psyche and orations in greater detail to determine whether he is using questionable means to achieve good ends for a troubled nascent democracy or seeking unbridled personal power as an end in itself. Brookings Institution scholar Fiona Hill said Putinís centralization measures reflect both his own personality and esteem for order and stability, as well as a larger, and very familiar, Russian historical pattern of retrenchment when leaders have felt the pace of change was becoming excessive. ìIn Russia, there is always a desire for stability and orderóthatís what Putin is responding to,î Hill said. ìHe saw the developments of political institutions as something that threatened him, and heís now trying to create an orderly, predictable and stable situation. But that will lead in the direction of rigidity and constrain Russiaís ability to move forward and modernize. By contrast, the Chinese [who have themselves limited democratic growth], are much more willing to open up. This is a hermit crab approach.î One consequence of such centralization, Hill said, is the inability of local leaders to deal effectively with crises. An example many note is the Beslan standoff itself, where the crisis was exacerbated by a disorganized response among local Russian authorities and by logistical failures that reportedly forced even federal troops to beg for bullets from the local populace. Another example is the governmentís slow response to the health and demographic challenges facing Russia. Demographers say that low birth rates, a falling life expectancy and rising HIV/AIDS infections could decimate Russiaís current population of 144 million over the next half century. Some contend that Putin has downplayed the potential threat of HIV/AIDS, where infections are increasingly moving beyond needle-sharing drug users into the general population. The New Yorker in a recent article reported that neither Putin nor his deputies had been willing to meet with Peter Piot, who heads the United Nationís AIDS program, unlike many world leaders in countries facing severe threats from the disease, and that Russia has budgeted far less to fight the disease than countries with comparable economic resources and a similarly sized HIV/AIDS risk. The consequences of further centralization of power are compounded by the fact that under the 1993 Russian Constitution, the president already enjoys a great deal of power, Tucker said. ìAmong the powers held by the president are the abilities to chair meetings of the government, nominate the prime minister, who then selects the government, remove the prime minister, initiate legislation, veto legislation initiated by the government, issue decrees that are not subject to parliamentary review, and directly command units of the military, police and intelligence services,î Tucker said. ìIn the language of political science, Russia is often referred to as a ësuper-presidentialí system due to the preponderance of legal powers enjoyed by the president.î Putin opines volubly on the proper form of democratic political structures in Russia in speeches available on the Kremlin Web site. He appears to insist that such structures be tied to Russiaís history and that they enhance, rather than reduce, the power of the state and what he views as state well-being. As he told the Chinese media in a recent interview: ìWe have a common vision that at the basis of these processes, at the basis of the development of the state, there should be democracy. And, taking into account the special features of our historical development, our experience and the realities of the present day, we will strive to build a political system and organize mutual relations between state and society so that they not only do not violate the system of democracy, but strengthen it.î According to experts interviewed for this article, the ability of outsiders to influence Putin and ordinary Russians may be limited. Matlock said the United States, for example, has limited its influence in Russian domestic politics because of its own electoral mishaps and a series of foreign policy steps deemed hostile and adverse by Putin and Russians as a whole. Matlock noted the United Statesís own serious electoral shortcomings in the 2000 presidential elections, as well Washington and Europeís failure to sufficiently take Russian concerns into account in such areas as the expansion of NATO to former Soviet Bloc countries and the exclusion of Russians from diplomacy to resolve the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. ìWe have created a situation in foreign policy that gives little leverage in [Russian] domestic policy,î Matlock said. ìUnder the current administration, Putin has had to cave in almost every area.î Matlock added that foreign observers should feel free to express their concerns, but suggested they take into account their own station and the self-defensive instincts of Putin and the Russian people to make their criticisms as constructive as possible. ìSo far as criticism is concerned, I think that it is important for scholars and other private persons to express their concerns and views,î he said. ìI doubt that official statements by the U.S. government are of any use. Comments by senators and congressmen also are more likely to raise hackles than lead to more democratic practices. Russians, like everybody else, resent being lectured to, particularly by people they believe are hypocritical regarding many democratic practices. At least their president received a majority of the votes cast in the last election, they would point out.î Hill said a large part of the problem is that communication between Russia and the West has become reflexive and based on needs rather than attempts to understand the context of each sideís viewpoints. ìWeíre not engaging them on terms using the context of their hi story, the Russian context, to help them understand that these moves are self-defeating. To get to the roots of this, we need to explain things to them in their terms.î Matlock said certain steps by Putin in the months and years to come well help decide the proper degree of concern regarding Russian democracy. ìWeíll have to watch how they resolve the Yukos affair. Do they continue going after one oligarch after another? Does [Putin] think the others are sufficiently cowed that he will not go after them? Another key factor is whether he will amend the constitution to allow himself a third term. If he decides to relinquish power after two terms, that will be positive. If he doesnít, that will be bad. Unfortunately, itís fairly easy to amend the constitution. So far, he hasnít made a flat statement one way or other, though at times heís said he only intends to serve two terms. ìThere is also the issue of the type of people that he will nominate [under the new plan] as state governors,î Matlock added. ìIf they are good managers with clean records, people will applaud that. If he just sends cronies and they use their authority to take over local assets, that is obviously bad. We donít know the picture yet and how that will proceed.î Hill said that in evaluating Putin and Russian democracy in the near future, she will look to see if Putin attempts to extend his control to the municipal level, where democracy is most vibrant. She will also be watching attempts to extend media control to the print media and the Internet, as well as attempts to create a party similar to the Soviet Union-era Communist Party to leverage his centralized leadership style. Still, even under the best of circumstances, Matlock said observers should be aware that it will take a long time for Russia to transition to full democracy. ìTo expect too much is a mistake,î Matlock said. ìI was asked in 1989 by young Russians how long it would take for Russia to become a normal country with basic institutions and habits we have in the West, and I said two generations. Itís [only] been half a generation, and they are more than a quarter of the way there. That doesnít mean they will reach it. But either way, it is going to take them a while and there is no way to shortcut that process. It took us 200 years to reach our current processes. When people apply our current standard to Russia and then criticize it, I find that to be disingenuous.î David Tobenkin is a freelance writer in Washington, D.C.