Ambassador Pritchard Critical Of Bushís Dealings With North Korea by Michael Coleman Some conservatives accuse Ambassador Charles L. "Jack" Pritchard of coddling the North Koreans in nuclear negotiations, but no one could criticize him for failing to speak his mind about the Bush administrationís diplomatic policies toward the communist country. Pritchard, a former National Security Council official and U.S. envoy who served in the Clinton and current Bush administrations, resigned his post as the top American negotiator on the North Korean nuclear crisis last September and took a job as a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution. During a recent hour-long interview with The Washington Diplomat, Pritchard said he left the White House because key decision-makers refused to heed his call for sustained diplomatic engagement with North Korea. And he spoke like a man freed from the verbal shackles placed on most White House officials. "This administration has done almost everything wrong in dealing with North Korea," Pritchard said matter-of-factly. Despite his new status as an ex-government official, Prit chard remains a key player in the tense relationship between the United States and North Korea. In January, he was one of several experts who traveled to Pyongyang and toured the Yongbyon nuclear complex. North Korea has long threatened to proceed with efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and Pritchard said his visit lent credence to their claim. "We saw that the nuclear reactor is now operational, we saw that the 8,000 spent fuel rods are goneóno longer thereówe saw some reprocessing capability, and we talked with their scientists," Pritchard said. "We did not see a bomb, nor can we accurately say, ëYes, they have a nuclear deterrent.í But I believe they have reprocessed the spent fuel rods and have probably turned them into metal. There is the possibility they have gone from having one or two weapons to maybe eight weapons." Pritchard has spent a career cultivating his expertise on Asian issues. During a 28-year Army career, he held various military assignments with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, serving as the country director for Japan. In 1996, Pritchard joined the National Security Council as director for Asian affairs. In that role, he advised President Clinton and National Security Advisors Anthony Lake and Samuel Berger on U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region. He served as deputy chief negotiator for the U.S.-Korea peace talks in 1997 and solicited an apology from North Korea for its hostile incursion into South Korea in 1996. The apology was widely credited with getting four-party peace talks back on track at the time. "Normally, the NSC doesnít get involved in negotiations, but things were a little dicey and the White House was playing a more active role than they might otherwise have," Pritchard explained. "It led to my being a full-time participant in the four-party talks, and I ultimately became the chief negotiator." Pritchard said the since Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush administration has acknowledged North Korea as a growing threat but done little to quell it. He said the North Koreans have a deserved reputation as difficult, even maddening, to negotiate with. But he added that the alternative to engaging in difficult negotiations is sitting back and doing nothingówhile North Korea steadily marches toward fulfilling its promise to become a full-scale nuclear threat. Iraq was a much easier target for the Bush administration, Pritchard said, but also a much milder threat. "When you take a look at Iraq and North Korea, there is absolutely no comparison as to what was the most dangerous element to U.S. and world security with regard to weapons of mass destructionóno comparison," he said. Pritchard said North Koreaís negotiators "require a level of respect" that one would expect from large, powerful nations such as Germany or Russia, which is slightly bizarre for a country of no real international stature save their nuclear program and military aggressiveness. Pritchard said the Pyongyang government tends to make outrageous demands, knowing that it will never see those demands fulfilled. However, it sets the bar exorbitantly high, knowing the result will be something less yet still acceptable to it. "The North Koreans are extraordinarily sensitive, very demanding on any subject, and it takes a good deal of time to get to the final resolution." The North Koreans in December 2002 began a process of unfreezing their nuclear program and put the United States on notice. An Agreed Framework reached in 1994 stated that North Korea would forsake its nuclear ambitions in exchange for removal of sanctions and energy assistance from the United States. But the deal began to unravel in 2002 when North Korea expelled weapons inspectors and later withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Bush has since adamantly refused to reward the regime with bilateral negotiations. "The North Koreans have continued down the track they set on and that was the development of additional nuclear weapons," Pritchard said. "They told us what they intended to do, in advance, every step of the way. None of this was a surprise to the U.S." Pritchard contends that the Bush administration has made a huge blunder by consistently refusing to bargain with North Korea. "It means we have to reverse what they have done, rather than have been engaged in a process during this period of time to prevent them from developing nuclear weapons," he said. "From a negotiating point of view, we have a more difficult job of reversing what they have done." The conservative Wall Street Journalís editorial page, a leading critic of what it describes as Pritchardís diplomatic freelancing, has portrayed his efforts as meddling and counterproductive to the Bush administrationís hard-line stance on North Korea. In a Jan. 26, 2004, editorial, the Journal opined that North Korea has consistently reneged on every promise it has made to the United States and that further appeasement will only result in more delay and deception. The newspaper criticized Pritchardís acceptance of North Koreaís invitation to tour Yongbyon earlier this year. "Maybe by opening the door to Mr. Pritchard and Co. the North Koreans figure they can embarrass Mr. Bush or play into the presidential campaign," the editorial said. "But for those who believe that the North Koreans can be sweet-talked into a new dealóand that we should believe them this timeóthe irony is that this high-profile invitation to one of the administrationís leading critics may only stiffen the Bush resolve. We hope so." Pritchard, a good-natured but clearly serious man, admitted that heís been stung by some of the criticism, especially since he said heís tried to helpónot hinderóU.S. efforts in North Korea. "Within the Clinton administration, I was viewed as the hawkóskeptical, cautious and tough," Pritchard said. "Today, Iím the same guy with the same philosophy, and Iím seen as being on the far left." In 1994, a consortium of nations including the United States, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea embarked on talks after it became clear that North Korea was attempting to process enriched uranium. Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea was supposed to have given up its nuclear program and the United States would provide the country with two light-weight reactors or 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil each year. When the deal began to collapse in late 2002, the Bush administration signaled it would play hardball with North Koreaóno negotiatingóthen turned its attention to Iraq. "The administration chose in a predetermined manner to go after Iraq and in doing so precluded any serious consideration and stoppage of what North Korea was doing," Pritchard said, arguing that similar unilateral action in North Korea could have disastrous consequences. "We have an allied relationship with South Korea and Japanówe donít have the ability to take unilateral military action against North Korea," he explained. "You attack Iraq and what are the consequences? Iraq collapses. It doesnít have the capability to attack Israel or its neighbors anymore," he said. "You attack North Korea in a military way, and you could have millions of casualties in South Korea if the North Koreans choose to respond. "It would not be a stretch to say a Korean war would end up with millions of casualties," Pritchard added. President Bush jangled an already agitated North Koreaís nerves in his State of the Union speech in January 2002 when he cast the country as part of an "axis of evil" along with Iran and Iraq. The inflammatory phrase set up a doomsday scenario in the minds of North Korean government officials, Pritchard said. "This administration has painted a picture for North Korea that says we can take you out. You are on our list for a preemptive strike because you are an evil regime," he said. "So, any kind of military actionóeven if we intended it to be a limited surgical strikeówould be perceived as an initial phase of an all-out U.S. attack on North Korea, and the North Koreans are not going to sit back and take it. "If they already think they are going to be annihilated, they have no choice but to respond." Pritchard, a six handicap on the golf course, now spends his days writing essays and lecturing on Japan and Korea, including Japanís role in East Asia, North Koreaís nuclear program, and the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea security relationship. He said he is gratified that the Brookings Institution, for which he has immense respect, sees value in his contributions. But he is a "visiting" fellow, which means that he hopes to return to government work when the right opportunity presents itself. "I have developed a sense of worth in the international arena," Pritchard said. "Iíd like to continue to make a contribution if there were another administration." In the meantime, he said that he will continue to "shine a spotlight on some of the cockroaches" in the Bush administration and, hopefully, stimulate productive talks that can lead to securing the North Korean nuclear threat. "There is an element in this administration who havenít thought through the consequences in North Korea or chooses to believe they wonít occur," Pritchard said. And if we continue to ignore the threat or decide to take military action without a coalition of international support? "Then weíve got a huge problem on our hands." Michael Coleman is a freelance writer in Washington, D.C.