Many Analysts Say Neoconservatives Driving U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda by John Shaw For many, there is a central mystery that envelops the Bush presidency. How did it come to pass that a candidate who advocated cautious, traditional Republican foreign policy ideas in the 2000 presidential campaignóand did not even receive the majority of votes cast in that electionóis now presiding over a sweeping revolution of U.S. foreign policy? President George W. Bush and his foreign policy team have repeatedly argued that the events of Sept. 11, 2001, transformed the global security climate and demanded a fundamentally different approach to U.S. foreign policy than that of the past half century. Bush has said that in this post-Sept. 11 world, traditional foreign policy doctrines are no longer relevant and that a more assertive posture is needed to fight terrorism and stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But some analysts argue that this revolution in U.S. foreign policy was conceived and advocated well before 9/11 by a group that is now effectively in control of U.S. national security policy: the neoconservatives. The idea that neoconservatives are driving U.S. foreign policy has been dismissed as conspiratorial nonsense by administration officials. They say that most definitions of a "neoconservative" would leave out President Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. They also say it is not plausible that U.S. foreign policy has been hijacked by a group of sub-Cabinet officials and their allies outside of government. Nonetheless, a growing number of analysts argue that for various reasons, the U.S. foreign policy agenda is now largely the neoconservative agenda, which places a strong emphasis on aggressive and, if necessary, unilateral action by the United States to promote democracy and free markets and to preserve American primacy. Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.), the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in several major speeches last year that neoconservatives have been driving U.S. foreign policy and are pushing it into a new, and dangerous, direction. "This is the most ideological administration in U.S. history, led by neoconservatives who believe that the only asset that counts is our military might," Biden said last fall. As the national and international focus on neoconservatives sharpens, questions continue about who these neoconservatives are, what they believe in, and how much influence they have over Bush and his foreign policy team. In general terms, neoconservatives believe that the United States should use its unrivaled power without apology to promote its values and interests around the world. They argue that contemporary threats cannot always be contained or deterred, so they must be prevented, sometimes through pre-emptive military action. Neoconservatives also believe the United States was far too passive in confronting the mounting threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in the 1990s. And they say the United States has been unnecessarily constrained by multilateral institutions that cannot effectively confront threats to global security and donít adequately protect American interests and values. Most neoconservatives strongly support Israel, and some have close ties to the Likud Party. Israel, they argue, is a bastion of democracy and stability in a chaotic region dominated by autocratic regimes. They envision a democratic transformation of the Middle East, with Israel as a foundation and a newly democratic Iraq as a model. Analysts say the original neoconservatives were a small group of mostly Jewish intellectuals who, during the 1960s and 1970s, grew disenchanted with Americaís social excesses and unwillingness to spend more on defense. Many of the original neoconservatives were Democrats who felt abandoned by their partyís leftward drift on national security issues. They venerated Democratic Sen. Henry "Scoop" Jackson of Washington state for his hawkish views on defense spending and the Soviet Union. The first generation of neoconservatives also had little time for mainstream Republican foreign policy as exemplified by the detente policies of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. Neoconservatives were inspired by the presidency of Ronald Reagan and still look to the Reagan years as a magical time in which American military strength, animated by moral clarity, transformed international affairs. By the 1980s, most neoconservatives had become Republicans and celebrated Reagan for his willingness to boost defense spending and to challenge the Soviet Union, both geopolitically and rhetorically. In the neoconservative world view, Americaís international posture weakened during the first Bush presidency and especially during the Clinton years. They argue that the Clinton administration was too reluctant to project power, too unwilling to increase defense spending, and too concerned with the approval of the United Nations and Americaís allies. Neoconservatives took heart when George W. Bush assumed the presidency in January 2001 but had ambivalent views about his administration until its foreign policy was transformed in the aftermath of 9/11. Even as neoconservatives have become more prominent and important, there continue to be debates about what constitutes neoconservative thought. Irving Kristol, widely seen as one of the founders of the neoconservative movement, argued in an essay last year that neoconservatives have never sought to offer a comprehensive foreign policy vision. Neoconservatives, he said, should be regarded as an intellectual undercurrent that surfaces intermittentlyóa "persuasion, one that manifests itself over time but erratically, and whose meaning we clearly glimpse only in retrospect." Kristol said the neoconservativesí chief purpose is "to convert the Republican Party, and American conservatism in general, against their respective wills into a new kind of conservative politics suitable to governing a modern democracy." According to Kristol, neoconservatives offer a hopeful and forward-looking vision. Their 20th-century heroes are a trio of former U.S. presidents: Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan. Domestically, he said, their central goal is to cut taxes to stimulate steady economic growth. They are less concerned about limiting the size of the federal government. Interestingly, Kristol said neoconservatives have no specific foreign policy agenda but embrace a set of attitudes derived from historical experience. These attitudes include a strong respect for patriotism, a deep skepticism about world government, a warm appreciation for clear-thinking statesmen who are able to distinguish friends from enemies, and a firm commitment to advance the national interest. "When you have the kind of power the U.S. now has, either you find opportunities to use it or the world will discover them for you," Kristol said. Neoconservatives have recently received a lot of attention because of their presumed influence on U.S. foreign policy under the Bush administration. Most agree that the key neoconservatives within the administration are Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Defense Undersecretary Doug Feith and Lewis "Scooter" Libby, the chief of staff for Vice President Dick Cheney. Other neoconservatives who are considered influential are Richard Perle, an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), William Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard, Robert Kagan, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Jim Woolsey, a former CIA director, and Victor Davis Hanson, a historian and journalist with National Review. Neoconservatives are shaping the debate in many ways, including running key think tanks, such as the AEI, the Project for the New American Century, the Center for Security Policy and the Hudson Institute. And neoconservative views dominate magazines, such as the Weekly Standard, National Interest, New Republic and Commentary. In a new book titled "America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy," Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay argue that what is referred to as the neoconservative movement is in fact two separate movements. Daalder and Lindsay say there are "democratic imperialists," such as Wolfowitz and Perle, who support the use of American power to remake the world in its imageóto the benefit, they argue, of the world and the United States. The authors also say there is a second group, the "assertive nationalists," who are skeptical of nation-building and doubt that American power can build what other nations cannot do for themselves. They argue that Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld reside in this camp. Analysts say the best way to understand the modern iteration of the movement is to review some of the seminal neoconservative documents of recent years. Kagan and Bill Kristol wrote a stirring call to arms for neoconservatives in a 1996 article in Foreign Affairs called "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy." The article expressed frustration at the policies of President Bill Clintonóand with Republicans for failing to offer a compelling alternative. Kagan and Kristol said it was time to challenge "an indifferent and a confused American conservatism," adding that the "lukewarm consensus about Americaís reduced role in the post Cold War world is wrong." They said that conservatives would not be able to govern America over the long term if they failed to offer a more elevated vision of the countryís international position, arguing that the American goal should be benevolent global hegemony. "The first objective of U.S. foreign policy should be to preserve and enhance that predominance by strengthening Americaís security, supporting its friends, advancing its interests, and standing up for its principles around the world," they wrote. Kagan and Kristol also said that a neo-Reaganite foreign policy should endorse a substantial increase in defense spending, greater citizen involvement and a renewed moral clarity. "Without a broad, sustaining foreign policy vision, the American people will be inclined to withdraw from the world and will lose sight of their abiding interest in vigorous world leadership. Without a sense of mission, they will seek deeper and deeper cuts in defense and foreign affairs budgets and gradually decimate the tools of U.S. hegemony," they wrote. Building on this article, a new think tank was launched in June of 1997 called the Project for a New American Century. The groupís mission was articulated in a set of principles that was signed by an impressive list of then private citizens, including Elliot Abrams, Cheney, Libby, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz. The statement said that although conservatives had appropriately criticized the "incoherent policies" of the Clinton administration and had resisted isolationist impulses from within their own ranks, they had not "confidently advanced a strategic vision of Americaís role in the world." "We aim to change this. We aim to make the case and rally support for American global leadership," they said. The statement said conservatives should not forget the essential elements of the Reagan administrationís success: a military that was strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges, a foreign policy that boldly promoted U.S. principles abroad, and a national leadership that accepted Americaís global responsibilities. "Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next," they said. The neoconservative focus with Iraq was spelled out in two lettersóthe first to President Clinton in 1998 and the second to President Bush in September 2001, just days after 9/11. The letter to Bush in September 2001 urged U.S. military action to remove Saddam Hussein. The neoconservativesí national security philosophy then finally came together with the administrationís 2002 national security strategy, which endorsed American primacy, the promotion of democracy, and the need for strong and, if necessary, pre-emptive steps to confront terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. John Shaw is a contributing writer for The Washington Diplomat.