January 2003












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Portable Missiles May Become Next Weapon of Choice for Terrorists
by Timothy Gusinov

The recent missile attack on an Israeli charter jet in Kenya indicates a frightening escalation in the war on terrorism. This may be only the first attack in the line to come, and only limited time may separate us from the moment when such weapons could be smuggled into and used in the United States or against one of the major U.S. European allies in the war on terrorism.

U.S. international airports with large numbers of intercontinental flights carrying not only Americans, but foreign citizensósuch as diplomats, business people and touristsóare the ideal targets for such attacks. Washington Dulles International Airport, for example, has three runways, offering daily flights to 72 U.S. cities and direct service to 30 foreign cities. The airport area has a developed highway and road infrastructure bordered by vast green vegetation zones, which would provide concealment and easy ways of retreat after an attack.

An attack on such an airport, especially involving an international flight, would have a huge international impact and could lead to temporary suspension of international air traffic in the United States.

Man-portable shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles, which have been developed by militaries of the United States, Russia and Great Britain, are possibly the next logical weapon of choice for terrorists. Deployment of such missiles would guarantee a high death tollóin most cases killing all those aboard the plane if collision occursóand perhaps causing vast devastation on the ground as well.

An incident such as this would also generate tremendous terror for the public, which would cause a devastating economic blow to air carriers and related industries. Despite the fact that such missilesóespecially the latest modelsóare considered high-tech weapons, there are many sources available for terrorist organizations to obtain them.

During the Soviet-Afghan war, weapons generously supplied to Afghan freedom fighters by the United States and other counties often found their way onto the black market through the Mujahedin training and supply centers in the Pakistani Northwest Frontier Province. Mujahedin were selling part of this weapon supply to support their families, who were living meager conditions in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.

Interestingly, the first Stinger missiles were captured by a Soviet Special Forces team south of Kandahar, but later some ìsurplusî Stingers were bought by Khad (Afghan communist government KGB counterpart) agents at the well-known weapons market in Rabati-Jali near the Pakistani border.

Most portable missiles in Afghanistan were the older Soviet- and Egyptian-made SA Strela (Arrow) series, but in the mid-1980s, American Stingers and British Blowpipes were introduced to challenge the Soviet dominance in the skies.

However, according to information obtained from the Mujahedin missile crew members captured and interrogated by the Soviet intelligence, they were disappointed with the Blowpipeís performance. Its disadvantages were low accuracy, heavy weight and a complicated guidance system. Blowpipes were widely used by the Mujahedin during the Afghan communist government and the Sovietís assault on the Mujahedin base in Zhavar, Afghanistan, in the spring of 1986. I witnessed two simultaneously launched Blowpipes missing a single aircraft and exploding harmlessly in the air.

Afghan fighters admired the American Stinger but reviled its weak points: If the target-locking system was deployed, but for some reason the missile was not fired in more than one minute, the battery pack lost its charge and had to be replaced. Stingers also had a relatively narrow angle of target acquisition and required well-trained operators.

Unfortunately, Afghanistan is not the only source of such weapons for terrorists. They are available in many countries with weak or corrupt regimes and in military conflict zones. For example, Chechen separatists acquired such missiles from Russian military stockpiles after declaring independence in 1992. Later they obtained much more accurate and deadly SA-16 Gimlet (ìIglaî or ìNeedleî) missiles. Last August, Chechen fighters used this missile to shoot down a Russian transport helicopter, with a death toll of 118.

Considering that Chechen separatists have established close relations with al Qaeda, and many of them even fought on the Talibanís side during the current anti-terrorism campaign, there is no doubt that this type of modern shoulder-launched missile is also available to terrorists. In fact, Russia sells such portable missile systems and its SA-18 modernized version to India, Malaysia, Brazil and other countries, and negotiates its sale to Iran.

It is unlikely that American Stingers delivered to Afghan freedom fighters in the 1980s are still operational. And even if they were, Stingers have a friend-or-foe recognition device and cannot be fired at American military aircraft equipped with such responders unless terrorists find a way to disable them. The question is whether or not all civilian aircraft have such responders. Even if they do, terrorists can still target non-American carriers. Also, ìfreshî Stingers could be obtained on the huge black market, which includes countries with such missiles in their arsenals.

Nevertheless, even if older models are smuggled into the United States, they are an imminent danger.

But to be realistic about the danger of portable surface-to-air missiles, they have limitations and restrictions regarding their use. They cannot be used against buildings or moving cars. The missile warhead is too weak to cause any serious damage to a building, and a carís heat signature is not strong enough for a missileís heat-seeking warhead to lock on. It is designed to lock onto the hot exhaust of powerful air turbine engines. Portable grenade launchers with charge-shaped warheads, such as the infamous and deadly RPG-7, not to mention the latest models, are much more practical and effective against ground targets. But portable shoulder-launched missiles do represent a serious danger to aircraft, especially civilian passenger planes not equipped with countermeasure devices.

It is hard to predict when and how terrorists might try to use these deadly ìneedlesî against civilian planes in the United States. There is no doubt about one thing thoughóeven a non-fatal single launch attack would deliver another devastating blow to the airline industry, which is still painfully recovering from the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks.

Scenario for Missile Disaster a Possibility for U.S.

Here is a hypothetical but plausible scenario of a terrorist organization using a shoulder-launched portable missile weapon against the United States:

Delivery
Modern shoulder-launched portable missiles have relatively small dimensions and are easily transportable across borders. Of course, it is hard to imagine that a frantic terrorist would try to take such a weapon through U.S. Customs in his personal luggage.

Most likely, several such missile systems will be delivered to the United States by a merchant ship. It is impossible to search all dark corners of such a vessel. The missiles could be hidden in specially designed caches and hard-to-search places on the ship, such as pipelines, fuel and water tanks. Every ship has miles of pipelines and numerous such hiding places. Ships deliver hundreds of cargo containers to the United States, and searching and inspecting all of them would bring port operations to a halt.

The missileís easily recognizable military green or camouflage-painted launch container can be repainted, and adding dummy elements can change its shape. It could be masked as a part of a shipís equipment or machinery, also making it hard to recognize. There is a high possibility that U.S. Customsí personnel who are not properly trained or who are looking for traditionally shaped long green tubes of missile containers will not recognize them, which is why such training is crucial.

In a more sophisticated but realistic delivery option, a floating container with missiles equipped with a radio beacon could be dropped from a ship passing near the U.S. coast and picked up by a small local vessel, such as a speed boat or private yacht, which doesnít have to go through customs.

Personnel
Execution of such an attack doesnít require many participants. The terrorist team is most likely to include the following members: one or two trained missile operators (firers) and their assistant (a spare missile carrier), a driver, and two to four members for cover and support. And such action doesnít necessarily mean suicidal sacrifice. If it is properly organized and routes of retreat are well planne d, its participants have a very realistic chance to escape. This solves the problem of human resources for the terrorist organization because there will be many more daredevils among terrorists, willing to take the risk and survive, than suicidal mission volunteers.

Tactics
Speed and mobility are the advantages of a missile crewóand their keys to success and survival. A missile can be fired from a high-rise building roof, from a briefly stopped car or even from a speedboat. In any case, such an attack would happen near an airport because these missiles are only effective between 12,000 and 14,000 feet (or 3,000 and 3,500 meters).

The terrorist group would most likely attack a plane from the rear, where the hot turbine exhaust ports are fully exposed and the missile could lock on them easily. However, attacking the same aircraft with more than one missile launcher to ensure its destruction is unlikely because it requires perfect coordination to do so, and this would also increase the chances of detection. It takes just a couple of minutes to prepare and fire a missile, and terrorists could be on the way to a safe shelter immediately afterward.

Targets
A plane that just took off with full fuel tanks for a long-distance flight is the most likely aircraft to be attacked. The full tanks would add tons of burning fuel to the devastation. Additionally, the planes are most vulnerable at this stage because all engines are working at maximum capacity, and loss of even one of them may be crucial.

U.S. planes or anti-terrorist coalition-country planes are most likely to be attacked. The good news is that it is next to impossible to bring down a huge civilian jet using just one portable missile. It would only be possible if terrorists get a lucky shot and cause extensive damage to aircraft flaps, or if a panicked crew loses control of the plane. Passenger jets have more than one engine and could attempt an emergency landing. Remarkably, when an aircraft engine is hit by a guided missile, much more damage is caused by the sharp turbine-engine blades torn from the shaft body and flying in all directions than by the explosion of the missile warhead.

Timothy Gusinov was a major in the former Soviet Army and an expert in weapons and tactics with two tours of duty in Afghanistan.

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