Eliot A. Cohen Strategic Studies Professor Helps Shape Debate on War With Iraq by John Shaw Eliot A. Cohen is one of Washingtonís most respected voices on military issues for many reasons. As professor and director of the strategic studies program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at The Johns Hopkins University, Cohen is blessed with a sweeping historical perspective, a probing and creative mind, and an engaging personality. But as much as anything else, Cohen is listened to because he speaks plainly, clearly and forcefully about life-and-death issues. In a city that thrives on caution, indirection and evasion, Cohen refuses to mince words or duck controversial topics. ìIn Washington, people sometimes donít want to call things by their names because there may be all kinds of undesirable consequences,î he said in an interview in his cluttered office that is dominated by a large photograph of Winston Churchill. ìBut an academicís job is to speak the truth. I know it sounds corny, but to me thatís the most important thing we do,î he added. Washington policymakers pay attention to Cohen when he outlines his views on defense policy a nd military strategy in lectures and in a steady stream of essays, scholarly articles and books. When President George W. Bush went on vacation last August, he brought along Cohenís new book, ìSupreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime,î which examines the relationship between political and military leaders. Bushís study of Cohenís book, coupled with other administration statements, immediately fueled speculation that Bush was very serious about taking the United States to war against Iraq. It also led many to believe that Cohen enjoys special clout within the White House. Modest and good-humored, Cohen downplays his influence on the Bush administration and in official Washington. He insists that he is just a professor who relishes his freedom to say what he thinks on crucial issues. ìThe clichÈ is that as an academic, your job is to speak truth to power. My experience is that on rare occasions, power listens and says youíre right. A little more often, power gets angry and says you just donít understand. But the overwhelming majority of the time, power doesnít even notice youíre talking,î he said. A native of Boston, Cohen attended Harvard University as both an undergraduate and graduate student. In addition to his current work at SAIS, Cohen taught at the U.S. Naval War College and at Harvard. He has served on the policy planning staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as an intelligence officer in the Army Reserve. He is a frequent consultant to defense and intelligence agencies, and he directed the U.S. Air Forceís examination of the role of air power in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. He currently serves on several governmental and private advisory committees. Cohen has also been near the center of the debate on the causes and consequences of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. ìSept. 11 was a turning point, a major historical event that changed attitudes and outlooks. It had a transforming effect,î he said. Cohen said American leaders should acknowledge that the nation is at war, and urges that this war not be vaguely described as one against international terrorism but rather defined precisely as a dangerous conflict with militant Islam. ìAl Qaeda draws upon much larger trends in the Arab and Islamic worlds, and unfortunately it reflects an important strain of Islam. Itís one of the hardest things to talk about in this country. We are an open and tolerant people, and it makes us very uncomfortable to talk about this,î Cohen said. ìSome people have said this war is not about religion. Thatís crazy. It is very much about religion.î Cohen believes the Sept. 11 attacks were an early battle in a dangerous war that he sometimes refers to as World War IV. (He describes the Cold War as World War III.) He said the United States and its allies have made some progress in dismantling al Qaeda. ìI think what we accomplished in Afghanistan is a big deal that is not fully appreciated. The other side now doesnít have a secure sanctuary in the form of a country to fall back on. That is very important,î he said. ìIf al Qaeda is dispersed and under pressure, it makes it hard for them to operate. I think they have had a setback, although they are far from finished.î Cohen said the American people must accept they are entering a period of global violence that may occur on a scale not seen since World War II, and that a sterner attitude is needed. And he is disappointed that there havenít been more sweeping changes in American society in the aftermath of Sept. 11. ìI expected more of a national mobilization if you will. I donít have a sense of the reaching out to bring all sorts of people into government service that we had after Pearl Harbor,î he noted. Cohen has strong views regarding American policy toward Iraq that he has delivered to Congress in testimony before key committees and has outlined in numerous essays and interviews. Although full of nuance and subtlety, his views can be fairly summarized in a few words: Saddam Hussein must go. Cohen said the United States faces a stark choice regarding Iraq: It can either allow Hussein to restore his economy, acquire weapons of mass destruction, and pose a lethal threat to his neighborsóor it can topple him and install a more moderate regime. Cohen added that the dangers of failing to act in the near future against Hussein are profoundóand unacceptable. The United States, he noted, has been at war with Iraq since 1991, and that only the level of violence has changed, not the substance of the relationship or the intentions of the Iraqi regime. ìThe simple facts are that inspections are dead and sanctions are dead. They cannot be resurrected,î Cohen said. ìThe real question is not ëwhy now?í but ëwhy not years ago?íî he said of a war to remove Hussein from power. Cohen argues that a U.S.-led war with Iraq would be very successful for several reasons: Iraqís army is a shadow of its former self, Husseinís regime is deeply unpopular in Iraq and would crumble shortly after a war began, and the American military is powerful and getting better all the time. ìOnce it gears up, itís pretty remarkable.î Cohen said the United States should be able to install a limited-authority, moderate, authoritarian regime that would safeguard basic rights, improve the lives of the Iraqi people, and pave the way for a modern state that lives in peace with its neighbors. He applauds the Bush administration for working with the U.N. Security Council to pass a resolution calling on Iraq to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction. ìOn the whole, Iím very happy about the U.N. resolution. I think itís a tribute to American diplomacy. Itís also a tribute to American resolve, but the point is not passing a resolutionóitís dealing with the problem.î Cohen said he fully expects Hussein to engage in deceptions and evasions with U.N. inspectors, and will seek to divide the Security Council and shatter its apparent consensus on Iraq. But he doesnít think this strategy will work for long and believes an American-orchestrated invasion will indeed take place. ìI think Saddam Hussein will be gone before President Bushís first term is over. I would even guess that he will be gone in less than a year. I think the president has made a visceral decision to do this,î Cohen said. As the Bush administration ponders a war with Iraq, Cohenís book ìSupreme Commandî has become a standard reference in Washington. Administration officials and lawmakers are reading it, and Cohen has been asked to discuss his work with senior military leaders. The book examines the leaderships of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill and David Ben-Gurion. It argues that tensions between civilian and military leaderships are endemic in modern democracies, and that it is important to understand how leading statesmen dealt with the military and led their nations in war. ìThis book does unabashedly accept the notion that there are, occasionally, great statesmen whose skill in the politics of war exceeds those of the average run of political men and women,î Cohen wrote. The scholar noted that each of these men had remarkable strengths that made them great war leaders: Lincoln possessed a cunning that was disguised as rustic simplicity, Clemenceau exuded defiance an d resolve, Churchill relentlessly probed alternatives, and Ben-Gurion studied, hectored and organized. Cohen said these leaders tolerated and even promoted generals who disagreed with them, but each treated military advice as just thatóadvice. He noted that these four leaders violated the ìnormalî theory of civil-military relations, which stipulates that political leaders should give their generals broad strategic directives and then get out of the way. Cohen disputes the view that generals, once given a mission, should have near total discretion and that political leaders should not meddle by asking probing questions about tactics, weaponry or other issues. Rather, Cohen said, a careful study of these great war leaders shows that politicians should actively manage wars by asking questions, challenging military leaders, building alliances, making operational choices, and reorganizing military institutions. In addition, these leaders were able to integrate mountains of complex, often contradictory, detail into their grand strategic schemes. They explained their visions to their nations and used mastery of language to build support. ìTo be a good war leader, there is a need for a powerful sense of order. You need a profound sense of discipline and order,î Cohen said. ìBut much of the genius of these four [leaders] was in their ability to tolerate disagreement, to retreat from poor decisions, and to change their minds. In war, there is a lot of improvisation, and a lot of the big ideas at the start of the war turn out to be wrong,î he added. ìSupreme Commandî has received rave reviews from military and political experts and has solidified Cohenís place in the top tier of military analysts. Cohenís scholarship and his involvement in several defense department advisory boards, including the often-discussed Defense Policy Board, is also cited as clear evidence of his growing clout in Washington. But Cohen remains modest about his influence. ìI sit on these boards as a way of doing public service. The truth is most of these committees most of the time are pretty boring. They are not nearly as big a deal as people make out,î he said. ìGovernment is an enormously busy place,î he continued. ìPeople in government donít have much time to listen to outsiders. And itís basically a closed system anyway, but academics can offer a larger perspective. Iíve got the leisure and some of the historical learning to help out with that.î John Shaw is a contributing writer to The Washington Diplomat.